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This thesis examines afloat command control with emphasis
on the computer-Commander interface. Emphasis is placed on
command displays found in Combat Information Centers and on the
bridge. The configuration and development strategy for these
two areas on SPRUANCE class destroyers are examined in some
detail. The planned Aegis Combat System is also discussed from
the command control point of view. Several issues in afloat
command control are discussed including 1) Role of the afloat
Commander and "President-to-Foxhole" communications, 2) Loca-
tion of the afloat Commander in a crises, 3) Manual backup to
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AAW - Anti Air Warfare
AEGIS - A combat support system. Also refers to a new class
of ships which will be equipped with AEGIS, the AEGIS
I
destroyer. (AEGIS is not an acronym; in Greek mythology
it was the shield of Zeus.)
APL - Applied Physics Laboratory (Johns Hopkins University)
ASROC - Anti Submarine Rocket
ASMS - Advanced Surface Missile System
ASTAB - Automated Status Board
ASW - Anti Submarine Warfare
ATDS - Airborne Tactical Data System
BPDSMS - Basic Point Defense Surface Missile System
CDS - Command and Decision System (Aegis)
CDSS - Command and Decision Subsystem (SPRUANCE)
CIC - Combat Information Center
CIWS - Close In Weapon System
CNO - Chief of Naval Operations
CRT - Cathode Ray Tube
DD - Destroyer (a ship type)
DDG - Guided Missile Destroyer (a ship type)
DRT - Dead Reckoning Tracer
EW - Electronic Warfare
GFCS - Gun Fire Control System
GMFCS - Guided Missile Fire Control System
LAMPS - Light Airborne Multi-Purpose System (a helicopter)

LSD - Large Screen Display
MPDS - Message Processing and Distribution System
MTDS - Marine Tactical Data System
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSSMS - NATO SEASPARROW Missile System
NTDS - Naval Tactical Data System
OSC - Operations Summary Console
OOD - Officer of the Deck
RPM - Revolutions Per Minute
R/T - Radio Tactical (a communication circuit)
SOP - Ship Operational Program
SSW - Surface-to-Surface Warfare
TAO - Tactical Action Officer
TCM - Tactical Command Module
USS - United States Ship
WC - Weapons Coordinator
WSAP - Weapons Status/Approval Panel
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A. COMMAND CONTROL AFLOAT
Command control has many definitions. JCS Pub 1 defines
it as "the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplish-
ment of his mission." It goes on to define a command and con-
trol system to be "the facilities, equipment, communications,
procedures and personnel essential to a commander for planning,
directing, and controlling the operations of assigned forces
pursuant to the mission assigned." This thesis does not pre-
sume to examine all aspects of command control afloat but in-
stead concentrates on one small portion of it: the computer to
Commander interface. It will examine some of the existing
afloat command control capabilities, operational concepts, and
technology. By studying the "computer to Commander" interface,
this thesis will examine how best to present information to
the Commander in a readily digestible format.
It is important to note that command control is a tool of
the Commander. If "command control" facilities, procedures,
etc., are the tool of someone else, they are not "command
control." Thus this thesis will not discuss operator display
requirements unless the Commander IS the operator. This thesis
will not differentiate between "command control" and "combat
direction," which can be loosely defined as the management of
specific weapons; the distinction between these two operational
phases is practically nonexistent for the afloat Commander.
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This thesis assumes that the means are available to sense the
environment and to gather this data for the Commander; assumes
that once he has this data he interprets it; arrives at de-
cisions, and is able to implement those decisions. This thesis
therefore will not examine the telecommunications process or
any computer attributes other than those features which trans-
fer data to the Commander.
This thesis contains a bit of the history of afloat com-
mand control displays, an examination of some present and future
systems, and a review of some of the controversies concerning
the computer-Commander interface. Some of this information,
as well as most of the opinions that are presented, was obtained
from guest lecturers and from informal discussions held with
Navy personnel in "onterey , San Diego, and Washington, D.C.
during the author's course of instruction at the Naval Post-
graduate School. Since some of these contacts do not wish to
be identified, some of this information cannot, of course, be
specifically documented.
B. WHAT IS A CIC?
In 1927, in writing about the arrival of the "wireless,"
Frederick Harcourt Kitchin wrote (9:3-4):
"The vast solitude of the ancient Seas has
gone forever . . . The disappearance of
solitude, the dispersal of loneliness (came
with) the coming of the Great Noise which
now resounds upon the waters. It began as
a soft faint whisper nearly thirty years
ago. And from that thin trickle of audible
signals, first heard by Senatore Marconi,
has come the mighty torrent which we know
today, a torrent which flows invisibly
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(yet clearly to be heard) over sea and
land until the world itself has become
too sma.. to bound its possibilities."
The mighty torrent continued to grow. Technical advances
during World War II led to the development of the modern Combat
Information Center (CIC) . As described by Rear Admiral Daniel
V. Gallery in 1945: (8:151)
"On the way up to the flight deck we pass
the brain of the ship, the Combat Informa-
tion Center. The C.I.C. is full of squawk
boxes, dead-reckoning tracers, status
boards, and vertical display plots. It is
like a broadcasting studio, stock broker's
office, bookmaking establishment, and air-
port control tower all rolled into one.
All information flows in through C.I.C;
is evaluated and displayed there; and the
orders to meet changes in the current
situation are flashed out from this point."
The basic mission of the CIC has not changed much over
the years despite great advances in technology. The Watch
Officer's Guide states: "CIC has as its major purpose the
gathering, displaying, and evaluation of data and information
in order to assist the commanding officer in handling his
ship. It also disseminates information." (18:81)
The computer, of course, has become an integral part of
the CIC in the Navy's better equipped ships. As stated by
Captain Robert E. Ammann in 1977 (1:2);
"The environment at sea, both the external
environment, which is frequently charac-
terized by adverse states and weather, and
the internal work environment, which is
frequently characterized by short response
times, created conditions of high stress ...
Vast quantities of oral and written informa-
tion (are) presented by multiple means,
such as face to face spoken word, voice
14

radio, telephone, visual displays, and
narrative messages, creating a high
"noise" environment and sensory overload.
This sensory load must be processed and
decisions made at a rapid pace, placing
severe demands on both the short and long
term (human) memory. The computer soft-
ware programs can provide assistance in
keeping track (of) the multiple task and
alerting the . . . (necessary personnel) to
events requiring attention, and preventing
things from "falling through the crack."
The most critical task, and the point where
computer assistance can be of considerable
value, is during situation assessment when
events are unfolding rapidly."
In short, CIC is the place with the "big picture," the
place from where the Commander can keep track of his own forces
in the air, on the surface, and under the surface, and can lo-
cate, identify, track, and, if necessary, destroy multi-threat
enemy forces. As stated in the Watch Officer's Guide (18:81-82!
"The capabilities of CIC are limited only by its equipment and
the state of training of its personnel."
C. OTHER COMMAND CONTROL RELATED FUNCTIONS
1 . Ship's Sensors
Ever since "the coming of that Great Noise which now
resounds upon the waters" (9:3), there has been some difference
of opinion between those who believe the bridge is the best
location from which to observe the environment and those who
believe that they can perceive more with the electronic devices
which are normally located elsewhere in the ship. The idea
that electronic servants can be better sensors than the human
eye, even at short distances, was tragically proven on 14 April
1912. Fifteen hundred lives were lost because men relied on
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their eyes instead of the radio, as shown in the following
passage (9:21-35):
" (At about eleven that night)
,
the lights of
an approaching vessel were seen on the star-
board quarter. Neither the captain of the
CALIFORNIAN nor his officers connected this
steamer in their minds with the TITANIC.
In their view the lights indicated a vessel
of about their own size, and were not such
as would have been emitted by a blazing sea
monster. It was just about at that moment,
eleven o'clock, that Evans, the wireless
man in the CALIFORNIAN, came actually into
touch with his opposite number in the
TITANIC, and knew, from the strength of her
answering signals, that she was close at
hand.... (At eleven thirty, he) took-off
his head 'phones and turned into his bunk
.... Ten minutes later the TITANIC was
ripped up by ice actually within sight of
the CALIFORNIAN, though not identified by
the deck officers on watch. There followed
two hours and forty minutes of agony in the
TITANIC, and of puzzled anxiety in the
CALIFORNIAN. Meanwhile the one man who
could instantly have identified the TITANIC
by wireless signals, and within less than
an hour have caused the CALIFORNIAN to
range alongside and save all those fifteen
hundred lives, continued to slumber in his
bunk ....
There was little to occupy the minds of
either of ... (the two men on watch on the
bridge of the CALIFORNIAN) except that
strange vessel yonder, of which they could
see one masthead light, a red side-light,
and two or three small indistinct lights on
deck.... (They) watched this vessel for
the whole of the time she remained in sight...
At two o'clock,... (the) Officer on watch,
who all along had been more than a little
worried, was becoming gravely uneasy. The
lights of that distant steamer were looking
"queer" and "unnatural." Some were being
shut in and others opened out. The red
side-light was observed... to be rising up,
and ... there was "something funny" about
it. The conclusion reached by these be-
wildered observers was, however, that the
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vessel was steaming away from the CALIFORNIAN,
and gradually disappearing to the south-west
.... At twenty minutes past two all the
lights had vanished. It was at this moment,
twenty minutes past two, that the TITANIC
sank. These two men had seen her dying calls
written in rocket bursts upon the black clear
sky, had watched her list and sink, and all
the while were unconscious of the tremendous
tragedy being played out to its end before
their eyes
.
Despite the inadequacies of the human eye as a sensor,
and to the surprise of many who have never been to sea, (5:42) :
"The role of the lookout has changed little
down through history. While its true a
lookout now has the benefit of binoculars
and sound-powered phones along with radar,
sonar and other electronic equipment to
help him safeguard a ship, no system is
infallible.
A low-flying aircraft may elude radar; a
submarine, with only its periscope breaking
the water, could slip by sonar unnoticed;
or hazards to navigation — such as wood
pilings or logs floating just beneath the
water's surface — could go undetected by
electronics
.
Although lookouts are rarely remembered by name
for their contributions to man's survival at
sea, history has proven that it will take
more than technological advances to replace
the ever-watchful eye."
As mentioned in the previous quotation, lookouts
have electronic helpers. Today's "crow's nest" lookout is
electronic, not human. A sensor, man or machine, can "see"
further with additional height, but the topmost positions of
a ship are reserved for its various antennas. When operational,
some of these antennas produce electromagnetic emissions which
are potentially fatal to anyone who ventures aloft. When a
ship is underway during low visibility or in congested traffic
areas, Navy regulations require that at least one human
17

lookout be placed as far forward and as close to the water as
feasible. Electronic sensors generally "report" to CIC, but
reports from human lookouts go to the Officer of the Deck (00D)
on the bridge.
2. Bridge
The 00D, who is the officer on watch in charge of the
ship, reports directly to the commanding officer for the safe
navigation and general operation of the ship, and to the execu-
tive officer for carrying out the ship's routine. The 00D thus
has many responsibilities, and among them is insuring that CIC
is kept informed of visual bearings and fixes, lookout reports,
visual signals and messages, and critical decisions made by
the Captain or himself. Every qualified OOD must be knowledge-
able of the purpose, capabilities, and limitations of CIC. An
understanding of both stations and how they mutually support
each other is important. On many ships junior officers' training
includes standing watches both on the bridge and in CIC.
The OOD usually also has the conn. The term "conn"
is not found in Navy Regulations, but all ship's personnel
understand that the person who has the conn controls the move-
ments of the ship. During intricate or dangerous maneuvers,
the commanding officer customarily takes the conn, or at least
is on the bridge to watch the overall picture and guard against
mishap. The Watch Officer's Guide summarizes the relationship
between CIC and the conn as follows (18:82):
"A good CIC has the whole tactical picture
and knows where all units are and what
they are doing. With this knowledge and
13

the advantages of space, good lighting,
and equipment, CIC is capable of providing
invaluable information and advice to the
conning officer. Maneuvering problems
are worked out and radar fixes are obtained
which permit the CIC officer to recommend
courses and speeds
.
Note, however, that CIC always provides
information and recommendations, not
decisions. CIC operates as a staff offi-
cer who is always careful to recommend a
course of action to his admiral. Decisions
are made by those responsible — and the
officer of the deck (or the officer who has
the conn) is the one responsible.
There are exceptions to this. Control of
gunfire in shore bombardment is directed
from CIC. An increasing number of other
operations, such as ASW (anti-submarine
warfare) and AAW (anti-air warfare) , are
now handled from CIC; the commanding
officer stations himself there and directs
the 00D who conns the ship from the bridge.
The fact remains that in conning the ship,
CIC's function is to recommend, the bridge's
function is to conn."
3 . Communications
It is clearly essential that a continuous and accurate
exchange of information occurs between CIC and the bridge, both
for operations and for the safety of the ship. Linking the
various other parts of the ship are many communications channels,
including sound powered telephones, general audio alarms, and
intercommunication voice units (known throughout the Navy as
MC * s or "squawkboxes" )
.
Intership communications are handled in several areas
of a ship. The communication center, or "radio", is the for-
mal message center, and the majority of the ship's receivers,
transmitters, and cryptographic equipment are located here.
Emergency radio spaces are isolated from other radio compart-
19

ments. Remote control transmitting and receiving positions
are located as necessary and include the bridge and CIC. The
signal bridge, located in the vicinity of the aforementioned
"bridge," is responsible for all visual messages including
flaghoist, flashing light, and semaphore. After the Kamikazi
attacks of World War II, CIC's and radio spaces were placed in
less vulnerable positions, away from the bridge. In recent
years, however, the disutility of having such closely related
functional areas spaced far apart physically has been realized.
CIC in particular is adjacent to the bridge on newer ships.
Overall, the best inter- and intra-ship communications are
found in a modern CIC, as will be examined in greater detail
in later chapters.
Although this thesis is not examining communications
in detail, it is obvious that some operational and technical
understanding of communications is necessary for effective
command control. It is important to note that the barriers
to satisfactory communications are not just technical and
fiscal but also procedural and perceptual. "Communications
are out" is a frequently heard alibi when the true problem is
not a paucity of men or equipment or money cr good atmospheric
conditions but simply a lack of training. Too often, for ex-
ample, exercise plans forbid any intentional communications
jamming for fear that such a realistic situation would severely
hinder the exercise. A system designed to provide data, voice,
or image transmissions and which is secure, jam resistant,
flexible, redundant, interoperable, and even affordable would
20

still be limited by the procedures and perceptions of its
users.
This chapter has introduced some of the basic elements
which affect afloat command control operations. In order to
examine these elements in more detail, the next chapter will
examine in some detail the command control configuration of
one particular class of ships, the SPRUANCE destroyers. Later
chapters will discuss some issues in afloat command control
and current plans and problems.
21

II. COMMAND CONTROL CONFIGURATIONS IN A CURRENT "TYPICAL" SHIP :
SPRUANCE CLASS DESTROYERS
A. MISSION AND CAPABILITIES
The USS SPRUANCE, commissioned in 1975, is the lead ship
of a new class of approximately thirty general purpose des-
troyers. This class's primary mission is anti-submarine war-
fare (ASW) , especially within a carrier task force. The
SPRUANCE Class ships can also be used very effectively for sur-
face warfare protection and for a wide variety of other mis-
sions as well. The use of many highly automated systems and of
low facility maintenance requirements reduces the manning level
of these destroyers to less than three hundred people. The
extensive use of modular construction techniques facilitates
both initial construction and future block modernizations.
With its built-in margin for growth, a SPRUANCE Class destroyer
is designed to be readily adaptable to many future weapon and
sensor systems during its estimated thirty year life span.
The AEGIS combat system, which will be discussed further in
Chapter IV, is scheduled to be utilized aboard SPRUANCE Class
hulls, and such ships will become another new class, the AEGIS
Destroyers. This thesis will compare the present (state of
the technology) SPRUANCE and the planned (state of the art)
AEGIS in order to illustrate some basic criteria used in de-
signing afloat command control systems.
The standard SPRUANCE Class destroyer, with her four gas
turbine engines, has a range of six thousand nautical miles
at twenty knots, without refueling, and a maximum speed of
22

about thirty three knots. She is armed with 5-in./54cal. guns,
torpedo tubes, and ASROC launchers. She also has or is sched-
uled to employ the HARPOON surface to surface missile, the
NATO SEASPARROW Missile System (to counter air threats at
close ranges) , the PHALANX Close In Weapon System, and the
TOMAHAWK Cruise Missile. The SPRUANCE also carries either an
SH-3 Sea King or two SH-2 series LAMPS helicopters. The aug-
mentation of destroyers with helicopters greatly increases the
range of the ships' detection capabilities and the range of
their weapons delivery. The powerful SPRUANCE is thus designed
to counter air, surface, subsurface, and land targets at all
ranges of interest.
B. COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER
1. Description of SPRUANCE CIC
The SPRUANCE CIC is located just below the Pilot House
and bridge (to which it is connected by a ladder)
,
just for-
ward of the communications center, and just above the ship's
data processing center and electronics shop. It includes
three functional areas: 1) Sonar Control, 2) CIC Maintenance
Area, and 3) CIC itself which encompasses four subfunctional
areas. These areas are 1) the Command and Decision area, which
is the area of most concern to this thesis, 2) the Air and Sur-
face Tracking and Identification area, 3) the ASW Weapons
Control area, and 4) the Anti Air Warfare / Surface to Surface
Warfare (AAW/SSW) Weapons Control area.
In 1971, Litton Ship Systems, prime contractor for the
SPRUANCE, prepared a mockup review report pursuant to the ship
23

construction contract. This three-part report gives insight
into the iterative design process which meshed current and
future equipment requirements, and will therefore be quoted
extensively in this chapter. It states (12:6-1 - 6-2):
"The Combat Information Center (CIC) is the
focal point of the operations required to
execute effectively the DD 963 (SPRUANCE)
Class Ship assigned missions and tasks.
The CIC is one of the most critical of the
combat system spaces of the ship, and con-
siderable attention has been devoted to
ensuring maximum combat effectiveness with
minimum manning. . .
.
The CIC is the key response mechanism to
command for information handling related
to the tactical situation of the ship and
is concerned primarily with the timely
and accurate supply, evaluation and dis-
semination of this information. Informa-





E. Disseminating information and
orders. . .
.
Information handling is a continuous
function which ultimately gives a com-
posite picture of a situation and en-
ables the commanding officer to make
a final evaluation, and formulate and
promulgate his orders for action. "
To enable the SPRUANCE to accomplish her mission, it
was necessary to increase the (12:6-3)
"Integration of the Combat System to
ensure effective exercise of command
and control and full use of the capa-
bilities of individual and collective
weapon systems. Based upon these con-
siderations, a Combat System has been
designed incorporating systems having
the performance capability to satisfy
24

the mission and to counter the threats
described in System Specifications.
Accordingly, the Combat System of the
DD 963 (SPRUANCE) Class Ship (is) de-
fined as consisting of all sensors,
weapons, data processors, and the
Command and Control System required
to engage the threats in an efficient
and effective manner."
The report goes on to describe (12:6-3 - 6-5)
"The following aspects of the DD 963
(SPRUANCE) Class Ship Integrated Combat
System:
A. The concept of integration of
systems utilizing the flexibility
of a centralized Command and Control
System
B. The operations, functions, and
capabilities of the elements compris-
ing the Combat System
C. The rationale behind design de-
cisions
D. The improvements and new tech-
niques that will be applied to the
Combat System to achieve the overall
ship mission.
The Combat System is composed of four
groups of configuration elements, each
group consisting of one or more sub-
systems. These groups are as follows:
A. Antisubmarine warfare group
B. Antiaircraft warfare group
C. Surface warfare group
D. Electronic warfare subsystems
(Proposed)
Each of the sensor and weapon configura-
tion elements has a specific functional
responsibility with respect to the over-
all Combat System task. The reciprocal
flow of sensor and weapon data is linked
by an integrated data processing system
called the Command and Decision Subsystem
(CDSS) of the Combat System.
25

The tracking requirements for the DD 96 3
(SPRUANCE) Class Ship stipulate that the
ship be capable of maintaining local and
remote tracks.... Some are utilized in
manual tracking mode, some in automatic
mode with computer assist.... The Weapons
element on the DD 963 (SPRUANCE) Class Ship
provides the weaponry consistent with the
mission to counter the surface and sub-
surface and air threats."
a. Key Personnel
The Senior Officer in CIC when the Commanding Offi-
cer is not present is the Evaluator, who serves as the Command
Deputy. He does not normally man a console. He is supported
by two principal deputies, the Weapons Coordinator and the
Operations Coordinator. Their exact responsibilities will vary
with different operating conditions and on different ships.
Like other CIC positions, "Evaluator" is a watch assignment
(often filled by the CIC Watch Officer) , but the Commanding
Officer may overtly assume this responsibility, in addition to
overall command responsibility, for specific periods. Regard-
less of his location, the Commanding Officer is always the
final authority and may override the Evaluator.
The Weapons Coordinator (WC) advises the Evaluator
concerning effective antiair and antisurface weapon employment
and is in charge of overall CDSS operations. The Naval Tactical
Data System (NTDS) , with which the SPRUANCE is equipped, has a
dominant air defense orientation. Since the WC is responsible
for the ship's AAW, he also represents the ship in the Forces
Weapons Coordination network with other ships in the task force.
The WC has primary responsibility for evaluation of the overall
tactical situation and for supervising the effective employment
26

of available sensors and weapons. All of the ship's responses
to task force orders pass through the WC either for his direct
action or to be passed to the other deputy, the Operations
Coordinator.
The Operations Coordinator advises the Evaluator
concerning surface and anti-submarine tactics and is responsible
to him for the surface operations of the ship and for ASW coor-
dination, including coordination with ownship-controlled air-
craft. Operating an Operations Summary Console (OSC) , he con-
trols the ship's underwater surveillance sensors and exercises
primary tactical control over the ASW search and attack opera-
tions. The ASW team is able to identify and track submarines
using a variety of sources and techniques, transmit these data
to a number of weapons systems , and pass on data changes even
after the weapons have been fired.
b. Command and Display Subsystem
The Command and Display Subsystem (CDSS) is the
primary integration and control system for all sensor and weap-
on configuration elements comprising the total combat system
of the ship. The Litton report gives a rather thorough explana-
tion of the CDSS (12:6-5 - 6-12):
"The Command and Control element on the DD
963 (SPRUANCE) Class Ship contains the
Command and Decision Subsystem and is the
means by which the component systems are
efficiently coupled together or integrated
to achieve maximum internal coordination
and effective performance, relative to the
external environment. The Command and De-
cision Subsystem is a combination of man
and machine designed to perform the func-
tions of decision, command and control.
27

"Decision is defined as arriving at con-
clusions after consideration of the ad-
visory inputs/alternatives for a given
situation. For the DD 963 (SPRUANCE)
Class Ship, human decision is based on
advisory inputs from an automated CIC
featuring a standardized display system,
supported by a data processing system
composed of general and special purpose
(fire control) computers.... By exploit-
ing the flexibility of the men and machines
of the Command and Decision Subsystem, the
sensor and the weapon elements are inter-
related with increased capabilities. Inte-
gration has been implemented in the DD 96 3
(SPRUANCE) Class Ship Combat System design
by central location and commonality of de-
sign of computers and their associated
software and displays, leading to reduc-
tion of manning, economy of equipment,
sharing of general facilities for common
functions, and automation of functions.
The functional integration is more force-
fully forged together by the placement of
command operator positions....
To provide the Evaluator (in the absence
of the captain) with an overall view of
the tactical situation, a display of all
available target data is presented on
the Operations Summary Console (OSC) ....
From the simultaneous long range display
of the air, surface, and subsurface picture
on this console, the Evaluator obtains in-
formation he requires to judge the require-
ments and responsibilities of the . . . ship
to the force. The Evaluator ensures that
the computer-based recommendations and
evaluations meet the ship's goal and over-
rides the computer outputs when he believes
the tactical situation requires such actions.
Since the Evaluator is the most knowledge-
able person in CIC concerning threat tac-
tics and his position is a floating position,
he may move to the rear of CIC which is
primarily involved in the specific environ-
ment the ship is presently engaged in. He,
therefore, assumes the ultimate responsibil-
ity for decisions made in that environment...
It is through this decision nucleus ....
that the first level decisions are made
(based on sensor information provided by
CIC)... Operators, ... monitoring the
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automatic features of their systems and
manually entering track data where
necessary
.
The Command and Decision Subsystem consists
primarily of consoles, operators, computers,
computer programs and peripheral equipment
that collect, correlate, and evaluate in-
formation received from various sensors
and weapons in order to coordinate command
(and other) functions. The console opera-
tors of the CDSS subsystem, in conjunction
with the computer programs and peripheral
equipment, perform the functions described
as follows:
A. Display. The CDSS ship operational pro-
gram (SOP)
,
provides for the display of pert-
inent tactical data concerning the air, sur-
face, and subsurface environments. Addition-
ally, the CDSS accepts operator evaluations
and requests based on this data. The display
is the man/machine interface for all CDSS
consoles and interrelated subsystems (ASW,
GFCS , GMFCS) . During normal mode of opera-
tion, the CDSS display function interrogates
all general purpose CDSS consoles for actions
taken by the console operators. Actions
taken at these CDSS console positions are for-
matted and processed within the SOP. Actions
taken at CDSS console positions which gen-
erate functional commands to other systems are
formatted by the SOP Display function and for-
warded to the system responsible for execution
or response. . .
.
B. Detection and Tracking....
C. Identification....




G. ASW Air Control....
H. Data Link Communications. The CDSS pro-
vides communications through Link 11 and 14.
Link 11 is the data link between Navy Tac-
tical Data System (NTDS) ships, NTDS ships
and Airborne Tactical Data System (ATDS)
aircraft, and NTDS ships and Marine Tactical
Data System (MTDS) units; Link 14 is the
data link to non-NTDS ships.




K. Combat System Monitoring and Control....
Thus, a central complex of man and machine is
provided in CIC for control, direction, and
employment of the entire Combat System of the
ship. This fully integrated, cohesive team,
aided by an integrated data processing sys-
tem, constitutes a complete, rapid, and mod-
ern facility for accomplishing the mission."
c. NTDS
The Naval Tactical Data System is a complex elec-
tronic computing, display, and communications system. Requir-
ing sophisticated hardware and software, NTDS is designed to
collect, process, and evaluate almost instantaneously the tac-
tical information needed by the Commander. It is most efficient
when computing a dynamic response to rapidly changing events.
Therefore it is better suited to dealing with the dynamic air
situation than with the more static surface and subsurface
situations
.
Uncorrelated data from a variety of both on and off
board sensors goes into data processing equipment located on
major combatant ships. Here information such as detection,
location, speed, and identity of friendly, neutral, and enemy
platforms is correlated. Consoles then display the tactical
situation with symbolic representations of enemy targets, their
classification and movements, and defensive and offensive pos-
ture of friendly platforms. The system also gives the Commander
a series of alternate weapons allocation information as well
as information on other decisions which must be made. When
the Commander makes his decision, NTDS can be used to transmit
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the necessary orders to the ship's fire control equipment or
to other ships and aircraft designated to execute the order.
Link 11, a computer-to-computer link between NTDS equipped
ships, enables a task force to be coordinated and to operate
almost as one ship. Link 11 and link 14, the teletype link to
non-NTDS equipped ships (usually ships that have no computers)
also provide the individual unit commanders with information
on the overall tactical situation.
The first generation of "air-to-ship guided mis-
siles" was the World War II Kamikazi aircraft. The main de-
fense then was antiaircraft guns. Because of poor detection,
classification, and coordination systems as well as poor deci-
sions, the Navy was inflicted with significant losses. In the
fifties, faced with Mach 2 capable aircraft and a developing
enemy arsenal of missiles, the Navy began research into auto-
mating CIC functions to reduce reaction time in dealing with
operational problems. The Lamplight Review, also called the
Lamplight Study, led to the first generation NTDS. (13) In
1961, the first operational systems were placed aboard the
carrier USS ORISKANY and two destroyers. A modified version
was installed on two nuclear ships, the carrier USS ENTERPRISE
and the cruiser USS LONG BEACH. These early systems had num-
erous special purpose displays, each with its own controls and
necessary training. To simplify this situation the next modi-
fication included one general purpose display that could operate
in twelve modes. By 1971, the fleet had 41 NTDS-equipped ships;
by 1978, that number had increased to 81. In addition, the
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Navy had over 70 E-2 aircraft with ATDS , which are linked direc-
tly to NTDS. Over the years, improvements have continued but
some problems, especially interoperability, remain as yet un-
resolved. A brief examination of this issue will illustrate
complications common to some other computerized afloat command
control systems.
Interoperability is a major objective. For example,
in the Gulf of Tonkin during the Vietnamese Conflict one basic
problem which arose was that the NTDS was incompatible with
the Air Force's tactical data system. The Navy couldn't differ-
entiate between a US Air Force aircraft and an enemy "boggie."
The immediate solution came from providing the Marine Corps
'
MTDS in Danang with an interfacing capability. Within the
Navy today, an NTDS operator from a cruiser has to relearn a
large part of his skills if he is transferred to an aircraft
carrier. (Engineering efforts are underway to solve this.)
Software modifications cannot be made simultaneously on all
ships, thus creating an inevitable period of incompatibility.
Necessary software modifications may inadvertently create addi-
tional complications, such as the recent change that required
the SPRUANCE Class destroyers to be the center of the task
force's reference grid. To understand why this created a
burden, one only need remember that the carrier is generally
the "center" of the task force.
Hardware "problems" are generally not technical
problems — the phenomenal growth of technology has, in general,
far exceeded the speed with which the ships can absorb it.
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Part of the reason for this technological gap is bureaucratic
— a conservative estimate for major system acquisition lead
time is seven years. Part of the reason is fiscal — in an
era of austere defense budgets, the Navy cannot afford to
throw away workable systems and equipment simply because better
technology is available. (The original NTDS test equipment
was aboard the ENTERPRISE approximately fifteen years.) Part
of the reason is that people don't know what they want. If a
dozen Commanders are asked what new command control technology
they "need," they are likely to give a dozen different answers.
As a result, of the combination of all these factors, not all
Navy ships are NTDS equipped. Technically feasible but as yet
unrealized improvements to NTDS include video graphics (with
geographic information such as coastlines) , reliable large
screen displays, and color. These issues will be discussed
more later in this thesis,
d. Communications
Communications equipment within CIC varies from
work station to work station but includes various interior and
external communications circuits; NTDS interphone between
various console positions, the Gun Control Officer, and the
Captain's chair; and various remote controls. Table I includes
most of the communications circuits available to the Commander
in CIC. The circuits marked "B" are also available on the
bridge. Those circuits that have a specific terminal for the
Commander are marked "C"; those circuits available to him in
the immediate command area but are dedicated to his assistants,
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such as the CIC Watch Officer or the Weapons Coordinator, are
marked "A"; and those circuits that are available only in other
parts of CIC are marked "0". All of these circuits are in










Dual Purpose Battery Controls
ASW Weapon Control
Guided Missile Launcher Control
Plotters Transfer Switchboard
CIC Information (NTDS Circuit)
NTDS Coordination
Surface Search Radar


































Sound Powered Circuits - Auxiliary
C,B (XJA) Auxiliary Captain's Battle
A,B (X1JV) Auxiliary Maneuvering and Docking
Sound Powered Circuits - Supplemental
A,B (X6J1) and
(X6J2) Electronic Service Circuits
A,B (X6J11 thru
X6J14) NTDS Service
A,B (X9J) Radar Trainer
A (X25J) Sonar Service
A (X43J) Weapons Systems Service
A (X44J) ASROC Service
Announcing Circuits
C,B (IMC) General Announcing System
C,B (21MC) Captain's Command
C (22MC) Electronic Control
A,B (29MC) Sonar Control/Information
A (32MC) Weapons Control
A (53 MC) Ship Administration
C,B (2CK) NTDS Display Interphone
Other
Pneumatic Tube (also on bridge)
EXTERIOR COMMUNICATIONS CIRCUITS
C,B Task Force/Task Group Tactical/
Warning (Pritac) (secure voice)
C,B Task Force/Task group Tactical/
Warning (Sectac) (nonsecure voice)
C Fleet Warning/Tactical (Fleet Common)
C,B Land/Launch Control (nonsecure voice)





A Navy General Warning Net (Harbor
Common)
A TWG Control
C Task Force/Task Group Reporting
(PriCl)
C ASW/HUK Operations (A,B,C,D)
C ASW/HUK Operations (A,B,C,D) (Sauci)
C Combat Information/detection report-
ing (W,X,Y,Z) (CID)
C Combat Air Patrol Coordination
(W,X,Y,Z) (CA/AC)
C AAW Gunfire/Missile Coordination
SAU-Air Control (A,B,C,D)
C Shore Fire Control (A,B,C) (SFC
Spotting)




Several enlisted personnel are detailed specifically
to receive, display, deliver, and/or transmit CIC communications.
Sound Powered Phone Talkers monitor their assigned circuits and
orally relay interior messages to their appropriate destinations.
The Dead Reckoning Tracer (DRT) Plotter operates the DRT and
maintains the surface plot. The Communications Message Handler
operates the pneumatic tube to transmit and receive written mes-
sages, and distributes and files such messages. Radio/Tactical
(R/T) Talkers and Recorders monitor their assigned circuits,
and relay, record, deliver, and transmit external messages.
2. Development of SPRUANCE CIC
a. Design Strategy
Development of the design specifications for the
SPRUANCE Class ships currently under construction began in
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1967. Correspondingly, design specifications for the future
AEGIS destroyers are based on the technology of the late
seventy's. Because of bureaucratic and fiscal constraints, it
is simply not feasible to build a current, "state of the art"
Naval ship. For example, the large screen displays (LSD) that
were available when the SPRUANCE was in the design phase were
too large and unreliable and it was not technically feasible to
place them aboard ships of destroyer size. Acceptable LSD's
are available now, but placing them aboard the SPRUANCE des-
troyers currently under construction would involve modification
of existing shipbuilding contracts. The Navy has been the tar-
get of much criticism regarding extensive changes to such con-
tracts, and the resultant settlement negotiations often require
a great expenditure of time and resources. Therefore known
modifications are often delayed until the ship is overhauled.
(As will be seen in Chapter IV, LSD's are scheduled to be
placed aboard the future AEGIS ships.)
The Litton report shows the space arrangement and
gives the rationale for the 1971 CIC mockup , including dia-
grams of functional areas, major items of equipment, and per-
sonnel operating stations. Room arrangement was based on the
organizational structure of CIC when the ship is in its high-
est readiness condition. The planning assumptions regarding
the duties and responsibilities of CIC personnel also affect
software design, but do not usurp the commander's authority





"In designing the DD 962 (SPRUANCE) ship
operational program software, operator
entry capabilities and console display
formats are allocated in accordance with
the expected functions to be performed
by operators in these various modes.
This is in no way meant to direct or limit
the Commanding Officer's prerogative with
respect to whom he assigns to operate a
console or in which mode he desires that
person to operate. It does, however,
assume that the console mode name is des-
criptive, or at least implicative of the
functions performed by associated opera-
tors from a total system operation stand-
point. "
A good deal of the rationale used in designing the
equipment arrangement was the result of a careful examination
of necessary interpersonal and man-machine interactions within
CIC. The operational sequence of various tasks was analyzed,
as were CIC personnel and equipment performance in functions
typical of the mission and tasks of a SPRUANCE Class ship.
These analyses led to the development of a chart which illus-
trated required visual, verbal, and tactile interpersonnel
relations as well as those between men and equipment. From
these data an Adjacency Diagram was created which was subsequent-
ly used in arriving at an optimal arrangement. This diagram
determined, for example, that for critical operations the Eval-
uator, and presumably the Commander, if present, must be adja-
cent to the Operations Summary Console. The Weapons Coordina-
tor, Operations Coordinator, and the ASW Control Officer should
be within twelve feet of the Captain's chair, and the DRT op-
erator and the DRT, Mk-116, and surface warfare coordination
consoles are to be in direct line-of-sight of this chair.
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The overall CIC arrangement of spaces and equipment
was also configured to allow efficient traffic flow during nor-
mal operations. The bridge—CIC ladder, for example, was posi-
tioned in the center of each in order to allow for the most
rapid possible traffic flow between the two spaces. A short
sample of the arrangement rationale in the Litton report follows
(12:6-43)
:
"The Dead Reckoning Tracer (DRT) has been
placed in the Command area, near to the
Mk-86 consoles to fulfill either a normal
plotting function (or) a fall-back plotting
function in the event of console/computer
failure and a shore bombardment role.
The communications station for the R/T
recorders has been placed near the Command
and Decision area center, but where they
will have little adverse effect on the
central operating positions. The pneumatic
tube and Link 14 have been placed at either
end of this four position desk. The two
60 inch plot boards have been designed to
stow in an overhead position in case they
are not required.
The Command and Decision area, therefore,
has both flexibility and more than adequate
adjacency with all other functional areas
of CIC. "
b. CIC Mockup
Litton constructed a "soft" CIC mockup which utili-
zed models which resembled actual equipments only in size and
shape. Photographs of control panels were placed on key items
of equipment in order to show important man-machine interfaces.
When possible, the equipment and space for the CIC were modeled
in accordance with contract specifications for the actual equip-
ment and space. All major items of equipment were indicated
in the mockup, including mundane yet necessary large items such
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as a file cabinet and a cleaning gear locker. In addition,
weight and space reservations were made in "phantom" form for
certain specific future equipment, such as electromagnetic
surveillance and counter-measures gear, in anticipation of con-
version and modification.
It has already become necessary to modify and in
some cases rearrange the SPRUANCE's CIC in order to accommodate
the installation of a number of new and advanced sensor, dis-
play, and weapons equipments. These include the NATO SEASPARROW
Missile System (NSSMS) , the Acoustic Warfare System, TOMAHAWK,
HARPOON, the Target Acquisition System, the Close In Weapon
System, and LAMPS III. Large blocks of equipment in CIC were
palletized and installed in CIC as units. It is therefore gen-
erally possible to install the necessary components of these
new systems in a functionally logical manner, employing the
principles of human engineering, and without disturbing the
existing structural arrangement. A brief synopsis of the
modification for two of these improvements is included here
for illustration:
NSSNS. In the early stages of the design of the
SPRUANCE, an area along the starboard bulkhead, just forward
of the status boards and vertical plotting boards, was "space
and weight reserved" for this system. Norfolk Naval Shipyard
recently installed the NSSMS in this area aboard the SPRUANCE.




LAMPS III. Two pieces of LAMPS III equipment are to
be installed in the SPRUANCE CIC. The OJ-200/UYA-4 (V) Monitor
Control Console is functionally related to the electronic war-
fare equipment and is therefore located in that section in a
"space and weight reserved" area. The Data Link Remote Control
Panel ensures the strongest possible data link signal with the
LAMPS by controlling the direction of the antenna. This panel
is controlled and located by the helicopter tracker and is
placed above his current console.
C. BRIDGE
1. Description
The bridge consists of the enclosed pilot house and
port and starboard bridge wings. The pilot house has windows
on three sides and part of the fourth to provide maximum visi-
bility, and these windows are slanted outboard to reduce glare.
A display strategy similar to that used in arranging CIC was
utilized in constructing a mockup of the bridge. Like CIC and
other parts of the ship, the work consoles were designed so
that operators would have everything they need at their finger-
tips. To quote again from the Litton report (12:6-24)
:
"The Bridge has the primary responsibility for
safety of the ship. This includes utilization
of navigational sensors in connection with ship
control during independent steaming, station-
keeping, rendezvous, underway replenishment,
tactical maneuvers and piloting."
Another part of the report lists the following bridge
functions (11:6-1 - 6-2):
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"A. Control ship's speed, course, and maneuvers
under normal conditions
B. Exercise command over entire ship
C. Exercise tactical control of ownship
D. Provide piloting facilities and infor-
mation to the Conning Officer
E. Perform record keeping tasks
F. Conduct interior and exterior communications
necessary to accomplish other functions





The role of the 00D , and the frequent presence on the
bridge of the Commanding Officer, has already been discussed.
Other personnel necessary for various condition watches include
Junior Officer of the Deck, Boatswain's Mate, quartermaster,
ship control console operator and his standby/assistant, navi-
gator's assistant, lookouts, and interior and exterior "talkers."
3 Displays
As stated in the Litton report, the UYA-4 Console
(11:2-2)
:
"Is the basic display console for the Command and
Decision Subsystem. Eight units are located in
the Combat Information Center (CIC) and one in
the pilot house. . . . (The) console in the pilot
house provides an operator with a 12-inch diam-
eter range-azimuth cathode ray tube (CRT) presen-
tation. A reflection plotter assembly is included
which shields external light and permits the op-
erator to plot the movement of contacts.
Ownship radar and sonar contacts may be displayed.
If desired, the console operator also may choose
to display symbology that is representative of
the contacts of other Link 11 Tactical Data Link
users. The pilot house UYA-4 console will be the
primary device used to enter ownship navigational
information and the Command and Decision Subsystem
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(i.e. computer). In addition it is anticipated
that the pilot house UYA-4 console could be used
to strengthen the command interaction between
principal officers in CIC and the pilot house
during advanced battle readiness conditions.
Without this console the pilot house personnel
must rely on normal interior communications
and one AN/SPA-25 radar repeater. With this
console the two individuals conversing (e.g.,
Evaluator and Commanding Officer or 00D) may
view identical or related CRT displayed infor-
mation as they converse."
It should again be emphasized that the bridge is pri-
marily responsible for the safety and navigation of the ship.
It is more concerned with avoiding collisions and less concerned
with the air threat. Therefore the air situation, which is the
specialty of NTDS , is "nice to know" information for the bridge,
but the more static surface display is critical.
Several other displays are also available on the bridge.
To quote from the Litton report (11:6-12):
"The UYA-4 console will be a prime source of infor-
mation for the Commanding Officer when he is on
the bridge. Accordingly the console has been
placed on the starboard side of the pilot house
in what might be described as the bridge tactical
area. This area will also include the tactical
table, the plotting/status boards, and the Weap-
ons Status and Approval Panel (WSAP) . The WSAP
has been mounted where it is easily visible from
the UYA-4 console because it may be desirable to
use both at the same time.
The report explains the WSAP as follows (11:6-6):
"The pilot house WSAP unit is one of two on the
ship. The second is in CIC. Only one is acti-
vated at a time. The WSAP is used by the Com-
manding Officer to grant approval as to the
type of ASROC pay load (torpedo or depth charge)
to be used in an impending attack. The type of
payload is recommended by and approval is granted
to the ASW Control Officer in CIC. The WSAP pro-




2. Depth charge selected/approved
3. Panel enabled
4. Panel cleared/reset.
Each WSAP is hardwired to the Mk 116 Weapon Con-
trol Panel of the ASW Control Officer. Manual
manipulation of an enabling key is required to
actuate the panel. Without (the) approval (of
the key holder, normally the Commanding Officer)
,
the firing circuit concerned cannot be electric-
ally completed.
"
Brief mention should be made of four other bridge displays
which aid in control of the ship. The Ship Control Console
provides a centralized and integrated location for direct
control of the ship's heading and speed. The Engine Order
Dual Indicator consists of a row of lights for each shaft
which indicate standard orders commanded. The RPM and Pitch
Display Indicator is a bank of eight digital indicators, one
each for actual RPM , set RPM, actual pitch, and set pitch for
both the port and starboard shafts. The Sonar Sounding Set
(Fathometer) indicates water depths both on a digital numeric
display and on a permanent strip chart recorder. Although the
fathometer is traditionally located in the chart room, on the
SPRUANCE the pilot house was chosen as a better location so as
to provide the navigator with depth information when the ship
is in shallow water.
4 . Communications
Most communications facilities available on the bridge
are also available in CIC, and were so notated in Table I.
Additional circuits include the light machine gun control
circuit, a dial telephone system for outgoing calls, three
voice tubes to connect the bridge wings to the pilot house and
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to connect the pilot house to the Captain's Sea Cabin, and a
transceiver for ready interchange of voice traffic with passing
merchant ships
.
This chapter has examined in some detail the command control
configuration of a typical ship. Chapter III will discuss some




Several issues keep recurring during seminars and discus-
sions on command control. Five of these issues and corollary
questions, as they pertain to command control afloat, are dis-
cussed in this chapter:
The Role of the Afloat Commander
Where is the Commander in a Crisis?
Attributes of the Computer-Commander Interface
The Commander-Computer Interface
Manual Backup Capabilities.
A. THE ROLE OF THE AFLOAT COMMANDER
1 . President-to-Foxhole Communications
One of the most common topics to arise in discussions
about command control is that of "President-to-Foxhole Com-
munications." This is a modern phenomenon, made possible and
perhaps inevitable by modern communications technology. The
phrase is self explanatory: it is possible to provide the
Commander-in-Chief with direct communications to any individual
element of the Armed Forces. Such direct communication, how-
ever, is an extreme deviation from one of the military's most
basic precepts: that of the chain of command.
Opponents of "President- tc-Foxhole" communications
cite the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of high level
"interference" which turned Commanding Officers into mere
"marionettes." These opponents claim that such officious
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meddling "degraded performance," and that the Captains had
enough to do (maneuvering their ships, preparing boarding
parties, etc.) without being bothered by Washington. These
opponents are not arguing against civilian control of the
military but only against civilians making long distance tac-
tical decisions. Their views might be summarized as "Give us
the orders and let us carry them out as we think best. Well,
perhaps we should allow the President to send one-line orders,
but we certainly can't have every staff aid choking our com-
munications with inane chatter." Opponents further note that
cutting all the intermediate links in the chain of command
leaves too many intermediate commanders completely in the dark,
and that these intermediate commanders need to know what is
happening in order for them to provide necessary tactical and
logistical support. A related question that these opponents
ask is, "Are we creating a generation of "commanders" who have
never made a decision of their own?" They cite several recent
instances of "passing the buck." For example, during the 1976
Lebanon evacuation, a boat officer did not know whether or not
to allow a child to bring his pet dog aboard, so he asked the
ship. The Captain "couldn't" make the decision either — so
Washington was consulted! If sea-going "decision makers" be-
come this dependent on high-level help, what will happen if
Washington is bogged down in more than one crisis, or if com-
munications are poor? Who will make the decisions then?
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Proponents of creating President-to-Foxhole communica-
tions links cite the Cuban Missile Crisis to support their
views also. When the US and USSR were "eyeball to eyeball,"
the President had both the right and the responsibility to be
directly involved. Whether or not to pull the trigger and
quite possibly start a nuclear war was and is a decision that
belongs to the President. Once the bombs start falling, then
the military takes over the tactical situation. As stated in a
1976 U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings article by Vice Admiral
Ray Peet and Dr. Michael E. Melich (15:29):
"The appearance of nuclear weapons... had had an
effect on the structure of naval forces and the
way they are commanded, even when nuclear weapons
are not being used.... This new mission capabil-
ity, startina about 1952, saw the nuclear strike
force onboard the attack carrier linked to the
President so that the order to strike could be
given expeditiously. This placed new demands on
the multi-layered command and control structure
used to execute conventional attacks and placed
a premium on reliable communications. It also
meant for the first time that the fate of the
entire nation could be decided by the actions of
a small group of men at sea with enormously
powerful weapons. Under these new circumstances
the actions of a single naval vessel at sea
could become of paramount importance to the
highest authorities of the nation. No longer
was the ship at sea in splendid isolation, as
she had been in days before sophisticated com-
munications and weapons of awesome power. The
individual ship had become too powerful."
Except in special cases, such as the Cuban Missile
Crisis or the more recent MAYAQUEZ incident, the President
does not get involved with the military's day-to-day opera-
tions — he clearly has enough other duties to keep him
occupied. The military is required to keep the civilian de-
cision makers as well informed as possible, and better command
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control communications will likely lead to more civilian
control. The military simply has to accept this inevitable
by-product of detailed, real time information systems.
Afloat Commanders are learning that they can actually
be aided by shore advice. In the Peet and Melich article, in
referring to national intelligence assets not under the control
of the afloat commander, they state that these national assets
produce large volumes of data which need further processing
to be usable. (15:29) Such assets may actually provide better
indication of the task force's environment than the forces own
systems, which may provide ambiguous or contradictory informa-
tion.
Orders from ashore may also originate within the Navy,
as Peet and Melich state (15:33) :
"Sailors have a horror of someone behind the desk
telling them what to do with their rudders.
Rarely, if ever, would a fleet commander-in-chief
(overall tactical commander-in-chief of several
task forces) issue tactical signals to units at
sea. We can visualize, however, that the deputy
fleet commander-in-chief or task force commander
may order a unit commander to change his emission
control condition or launch his electronic warfare
aircraft because the fleet command center would
have better information on which to base such a
decision. Messages emanating from a fleet com-
mand center would for the most part be advisory
in nature, telling the commander at sea the
source and credibility of the information being
provided, and permitting him to override the
advice, if in his opinion, his observation and
close-in sensors tell him he should do so to
save his forces. Of course, with the fleet com-
mander-in-chief in the command center, we are
sure the at-sea commander will consider the
source of the advice and the fleet commander-
in-chief, in turn, should be aware he assumes a




In general, the command structure should not be cir-
cumvented. Intermediate commanders should at least be kept
fully informed of the information and orders being passed even
if in some unusual situation it is felt that there is no time
to consult them. It should be understood within the chain of
command what sort of decisions should or must be made at what
level of command. This "appropriate level" is usually deter-
mined by "who has the necessary information, " by the possible
implications of a "bad" decision, and by general bureaucratic
maneuvering.
2 . States of Crisis
"States of Crises" are usually divided into levels such
as
:








In such a continuum, the differentiation between strategy and
tactics is blurred and perhaps only semantic. "Strategy" is
of larger, national scope and is less structured, involving
large scale, long-range planning and development. "Tactics"
deals with more immediate battle maneuvers. A strategic de-
cision may have to be made in days or even hours, but a tactical
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decision such as targetting may have to be made in minutes or
less. Commanders are generally strategic planners but may
become operational controllers in a crisis, and "command con-
trol" must change its basic character depending on the level
of conflict. However, there must be a smooth transition and
continuity of operations between the states of crises.







Response Implemented or Preempted
This thesis is most concerned with the time necessary for res-
ponse formulation and in particular the displaying of a per-
ceived threat to the Commander. It should be noted that most
of the response delay to this point is not caused by speed-of-
light communications but by slow human procedures: in a time
critical situation, man-machine and interpersonal interaction
times are also critical. It should be noted that most "crises"
communications channels are also used in day-to-day operations.
A Commander commonly spends only about five percent of his
time in "threat exercises" and the majority of his time is
spent on supervising his staff and on other routine details
necessary to maintain the Navy.
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3. The Role of the Staff
The Commander obviously does not do everything himself
but instead delegates routine decisions to his staff. He es-
tablishes general policy and is notified by the staff whenever
anything unusual arises. Of course, each Commander organizes
his staff and his information system according to his own man-
agement style. However, his general role is to establish policy
for the use of his resources but make all critical decisions
himself.
Since Commanders are busy people, it is difficult to
get their close involvement in systems planning. It is the
staff who usually meets with the designers of command and
control systems; it is the staff who usually sets the detailed
requirements such as, "how long should a history track be
maintained?" Does the staff want the same capabilities in a
computerized information, retrieval and display system that
the Commander wants? In many cases, no. The staff is frequent-
ly interested in static data. Some information storage experts
feel that such encyclopedic and historic data can be better
maintained on microfiche. For example, when the Commander
wants real time information on the current tactical situation,
a computer could display the location and identity of all
nearby platforms while the staff might be tasked with supply-
ing any necessary static details. There must be seme flexibil-
ity built into any command control system — it must allow a
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command to make some small modifications; it must be somewhat
responsive to the Commander's personal mode of operation. Sucn
systems must have commonality and interoperability, but it is
not feasible to impose standard inflexible command control
systems and arbitrarily expect commanders to use and support
them. (When used in this context, "standard" means identical,
but "commonality" implies an interoperable system with options.)
B. WHERE IS THE COMMANDER IN A CRISIS?
Since World War II there has been some disagreement over
the Commanding Officer's Battle Station. In a crisis, does he
belong on the Bridge or in CIC? This section will present the
views of various experts.
Rear Admiral Daniel V. Gallery's Naval career included ser-
vice in carriers, battleships, cruisers, and destroyers. An
aviator, he invented several improvements in aircraft machine
gun sights and was closely associated with the development of
the Norden bomb sight. On 4 June 1944, while Captain of the
jeep aircraft carrier USS GUADALCANAL, this unusual and imagin-
ative man made naval history with the boarding and capture at
sea of an enemy naval vessel, a German submarine. This was the
first such action by the United States since 1815. This imag-
inative officer described this and other experiences in his
1945 book Clear the Decks I In this book he stated (3:153) :
"In the past, whenever anything unusual happened
at sea, the Captain hurried up to the bridge to
have a looksee. Now, many Captains head for
C.I.C., instead of the bridge, because you can
actually "see" more there. The large vertical
plotting board in C.I.C. shows the present posi-
tion of all planes in the air, whether they are
friendly, hostile, or unidentified; of other
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ships; of land; and a great deal of other in-
formation. It is continuously corrected up to
the minute as the radar antenna sweeps around
the horizon.
You can glance at a radar scope and "see" an-
other ship twenty miles away on a dark and
foggy night. If you were straining your eyes
through the fog on the bridge, you might not
SEE this ship until just before you collided
with it. By radar you can "see" an approaching
enemy bomber a hundred miles away while there
is still time to organize a reception committee
if you work fast. But if you wait till you see
him with your eyes, it's too late to do anything
but lead out the fire hoses and alert the stret-
cher bearers. However, custom dies hard, and
some of the current generation of skippers still
stick to the bridge. As radar and television
improve, what you see with your eyes becomes
less and less important. The Captains of the
atomic age will pace the deck in C.I.C. instead
of the bridge when the heat is on."
Thirty four years later, however, the "current generation
of skippers" is STILL being told to "stick to the bridge," as
is evidenced by the following passage from the third edition
of the U.S. Naval Institute book, Command at Sea (4:204):
"Regulations do not specify the station assign-
ed to the commanding officer in battle anymore
than they do for other special evolutions such
as navigating in a fog or coming alongside.
Naturally, he must be in the position where he
can best do his duty which in this case is to
fight the ship. From time to time, it is argued
that the commanding officer could better control
his ship from CIC for certain evolutions and one
may suppose that for long-range, surface-to-air
actions with guided missiles, the bridge might
not be the most effective place for the captain.
When shooting and maneuvering, however, general
opinion in the Navy is that the captain should
be on the bridge where he can see and hear for
himself.
In the conning tower, visibility is necessarily
limited; on the flying or navigation bridge,
the commanding officer can see sky, sea, and
horizon. During a night action he has to be
54

in the best position to see for himself that he
is in no danger of running into the ship ahead,
or that some other ship will not collide with
him. In destroyers and smaller ships, the bridge
is always the battle station for the captain."
Discussions by this author with various members of the
Naval establishment, including several Rear Admirals, reveals
a continued divergence of opinion on this "bridge versus CIC"
question. This issue is critical to the whole topic of afloat
command control — obviously "command control" displays must
be located where the Commander can view them or, as stated in
the introduction, they simply are not "command control" displays.
Presumably all interested parties will agree that wherever a
Commander is located in a crisis, there must be adequate com-
munications and supporting staff and that he should be located
wherever he can best be kept abreast of the situation. Yet
there remains an "Old Guard" who avoids CIC — such as the cap-
tain of a nuclear combatant who visited CIC only once during a
recent two week exercise — and that was to accompany a visit-
ing Admiral on a tour. Some ship designers have been suggested
that all displays be removed from the bridge in order to "force"
such Commanders into CIC, but it is simply not feasible to
"divorce" the bridge from the rest of the ship. The best inter
and intra ship communications and the most information are
found in CIC. Because of space, lighting, and security prob-
lems it is also not feasible to move all of these capabilities
to the bridge. There are occasions when the Captain does belong
on the bridge, especially during the risky navigation required
in maneuvers with other ships or in picking up a man in the
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water. Even when the Captain is in CIC during a critical
situation, the Executive Officer should be on the bridge. It
must be noted that in many situations tradition and law require
the Captain's presence on the bridge. Just as important, many
Commanders simply like to be on the bridge. While it is com-
monly understood throughout the Navy that the Commander's pri-
mary responsibility in peacetime is the safety of his ship,
it should also be understood that in wartime his primary res-
ponsibility is to fight his ship. Just as there are situations
that require the Commander's presence on the bridge, there are
also situations that require his presence in CIC, for that is
where the sensor terminals and weapons controls are located.
Like the junior officers, he must be comfortable and expe-
rienced both on the bridge and in CIC. Only through familiarity
with all of his command control facilities will the commander
be able to optimize their use in a crisis, and in a crisis, he
should be wherever he can best fulfill the mission.
Since the Commander WILL be on the bridge during some criti-
cal situations, there must be some sort of command control dis-
play available on the bridge that will give him complete, prompt,
and accurate information. Thus a data link between CIC and the
bridge is necessary. On the bridges of some ships, such as the
SPRUANCE class destroyers, a computer console type of display
is installed; on others, the display consists of a television
monitor of the NTDS display in CIC. In any case, the display




ATTRIBUTES OF THE COMPUTER-COMMANDER INTERFACE
This thesis has repeatedly mentioned "command control dis-
plays," but has so far made little mention of the nature of
the display itself. The display should be graphical, not just
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will need an absolute minimum of
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er of information into decisions
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Studies have shown that the human brain can
only process 25 to 40 bits of information per
second when they are presented as a time sequen-
tial stream such as a printed message. This im-
plies that it would take the commander at least
15 minutes to understand what was going on. Yet
our common experience tells us that we can easily
process three million bits per second when they
are presented as a two-dimensional picture —
(e.g., a TV screen or a map)
.
Thus we have no alternative but to present the
commander with a picture — a geographic dis-
play — so that he can absorb the large number
of special relationships among the things with
which he must deal. Moreover, on a geoplot we
can express much of the "data" by the size,
color, etc. of the same symbols we use to mark
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The following table of display related attributes is not
a list of "necessary" features or even "useful" features, but
merely an incomplete list of features that may help to convey
information to a Commander. Such lists could be helpful in
establishing tradeoffs and improving the interface between
technological developers, fiscal planners, and operational
users. For example, color displays seem to be more appealing
to the theorists, scientists, and engineers ashore than to the
users at sea who do not see the benefits justifying the cost.
(Currently color is "dead" in the Navy — although systems may
be designed for future color conversion, no color display sys-
tems are currently being accepted for afloat displays)
.
TABLE II




Capable of voice, data, and image transmission
Commonality (adaptable to user, vice strict standardization)
Constantly updated
Credible




Of "Fail Soft" design, with reduced capability programs
Flexible (accommodates unforeseen situations)









Attributes the display itself might have include :
Clarity
Color
Conferencing capabilities (with interior and external stations)
Correlation capabilities
Decision aiding and predictive capabilities
Graphics
Hard copy backup (for reviewing exercises, etc.)
Interactive capabilities
Large area and zoom displays
Large screen displays
Message readouts (although some Naval officers claim that mes-
sages are not "real time" information and that a pneumatic tube
from "radio" is quite adequate)
Simple user interface ("natural," reactive interface that
accommodates a variety of users)
"Three dimensional" displays shewing the air, surface, and
subsurface situations.
Information requirements vary with the situation. Several
studies have been conducted to discern what information the
Commander requires, but there is still no definitive answer.
It would be easy to say, "Give him everything he wants," but
Commanders are individuals who want different information.
Types of information displayed might include:
Track, location and identification data
Track histories and situation updates






Satellite photographs with geographic references
Air plans, aircraft fuel status, and current aircraft
aloft information
Maintenance and supply data
Daily call signs and other communications information
References for further information
As has been stated, the data in an afloat command control
display system comes from sensors both afloat and ashore. The
vast quantities of data being exchanged seem to demand computer
to computer communications links between shore and ships and
between ships. But many naval ships have no computer, and
must rely on voice and teletype links for all communications.
In addition, the shipboard terminals on major combatants are
not configured to accept and process information transferred
in the "packet switching mode, " which is the mode planned for
use in the next decade. Some of the current thought about this
area is indicated in the following comments by Mr. C. C. Stout
(17) :
"For the past three or four months a new idea
has begun to emerge. It is rather simple yet
has a number of ramifications. The idea stems
from a variety of sources. It relates to my
concepts of Navy's NCCS (Navy Command Control
System) as a truly integrated system. The
easiest way to describe it is perhaps as a
missing computer to computer link. That link
is one between ships at sea and shore centers.
At the moment (the) Navy has shore data bases
at the FCC's (Fleet Command Center) which are
not trusted. I am sure that part of the rea-
son is (that) much of the input data comes
from ordinary run of the mill ships which gen-
erate data in a manual mode. (The) Navy has
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either not been willing to spend the few thou-
sand dollars per ship needed for a simple "for-
mat" generator or just doesn't understand why
it should spend such dollars. Perhaps it would
help if someone in a position of real authority
in OPNAV would stop for a moment and think about
the implications. On a daily basis information
is being generated and put into the data bases
which are supposed to serve as the information
sinks for our most senior decision makers. The
kinds of decisions they must make when the
"chips are down" require good information.
That alone should be adequate justification for
a shipboard C2 terminal. This might be a good
thing to price out. I think it would be in-
teresting to see how much it would cost to
provide good data using a "ship terminal" and
then compare that price with what has been
spent on the FCC ' s
.
At the moment only 21 Navy ships can receive
and "machine process" intelligence products
generated ashore. This is a fairly serious
deficiency in that the vast majority of ships
do not have (the) tools to display, in a
timely manner, the threat within the range
of weapons such as TOMAHAWK. This also seems
to me to be adequate reason all by itself for
a shipboard C2 terminal."
It is possible to provide an incredible quantity and
variety of data, but capturing and retaining great amounts of
unnecessary data will saturate a shipboard communications and
storage system. The ship must have a self-contained database,
but the question of "how large" a shipboard database should
be is beyond the scope of this thesis. It is important, how-
ever, to note the paramount role of the database to any com-
mand control display. What a Commander "needs to know" is
therefore a topic requiring more in depth research.
D. THE COMMANDER-COMPUTER INTERFACE
Thus far in this thesis the Commander's role in command
display systems has been that of passive observer. The sugges-
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tion that a Commander might personally operate a computer
terminal is strongly opposed by many Naval Officers. Regard-
less of the cause of this rejection of a direct "Commander-
computer interface" — bad experiences, lack of understanding,
unfamiliarity with real time interactive computer systems, or
other reasons — the rejection does exist and must be consid-
ered in any examination of command control displays. These
opponents are not necessarily anti-computer. They do feel,
however, that the Commander should not be tied to a terminal,
and especially not during a crisis. These officers feel that
when a Commander wants information he should interface with a
person who is capable of "talking" to the computer in the prop-
er format. (For the purposes of this thesis, this person who
is the link between the Commander and the computer is called
an " interfacer . " This job is analogous to that of the Sound
Powered Phone Talker, who is the enlisted man who speaks for
the Commander on the ship's interior phones. For example, a
Captain may say, "Tell Combat I want a report on that Boggie"
and expect it to be formatted into "Combat, Bridge. Give me a
report on Boggie 3." To protect against errors, the COD is
often required to monitor the phone system)
.
The attitude of those who think it unlikely that commanders
will ever operate computer terminals might best be exemplified
by the Rear Admiral who stated, "I manage people — I don't
operate machines." Yet another Rear Admiral pointed out that
his major task is NOT to manage people, that that is the func-
tion of his Chief of Staff. He also pointed out that Commanders
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DO operate some machines: they type or dictate memorandums
and operate telephones, for example. There are obvious in-
efficiencies in utilizing an " interfacer , " for both time and
manpower would be saved if this middle man were eliminated.
It appears that a major reason for rejection of a direct
Commander-computer interface is that many of today's com-
manders are unfamiliar with computers in general and with
real time interactive terminals in particular. Commanders of
the future will be more familiar with computers, but it is
totally unreasonable to demand that all Commanders become
computer experts. Because the computer is essential to mod-
ern warfare it IS reasonable, however, to expect the Commander
to be an "educated user." At the very least, he must know the
basic capabilities and limitations of the computer system and
understand its display symbology. His staff, of course, must
include computer "experts" — people who know how to extract
the desired information and people who can repair hardware and
software malfunctions when the nearest computer manufacturer
is thousands of miles away. Even if the commander IS the
"operator," it would probably be necessary to have an "inter-
facer" to ask unusual questions efficiently. With a good staff
to assist him, it is not necessary for the Commander to be a
computer expert.
As in any area of computer design, it is important to know
the desires of the user. As mentioned earlier, a Commander is
an individual with a unique management style. He cannot be
dictated to in his choice of system options. If the system
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is not designed specifically for him and tailored to him, the
Commander simply will not use it. The operational experts who
set the requirements for new systems understand this, and thus
a "standard" Commander's terminal is not likely to receive
budgetary consideration.
Again the word "commonality" is appropriate: the system
must be interoperable but have a choice of options, thus making
it adaptable to different users and different situations.
Among features which should be considered to assist the Com-
mander-user are function keys, natural language, and user-
defined abbreviations. Function keys can be used to key com-
monly asked questions, such as "where is " or "what is ."
Natural languages would allow the Commander to "talk" to the
computer in his own, i.e., English, language. User defined
abbreviations would save the Commander typing time. For exam-
ple, the user might want "CON" to be defined as "USS CONSTELLA-
TION." All of these options are available in existing software
programs, and they make operating a terminal fairly easy even
for novice users. Since such programs can be tailored to each
individual user, the entire staff would not have to learn the
code when any one user wanted a new definition.
E. MANUAL BACKUP — HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH?
Once it has been established that the computer is indispen-
sable to the modern Commander, the question must arise: What
happens when the computer breaks down?
One school of thought claims that manual backup is simply
not necessary and that retaining any usage of grease pencils
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is an archaism from World War II that wastes scarce personnel
assets. This school stresses the importance of computer re-
dundancy, recovery, and protection from any data loss. They
place emphasis on automation of remaining manual functions with
such technically feasible equipment as automatic tracking (in
stead of NTDS * s manual ball-tab-response), automatic status
boards (ASTAB) , and mechanized slide making. After all, these
advocates point out, a "modern" war cannot be fought without
computers. As one operations officer on an NTDS equipped ship
said to this author, "If we lose our computers, the battle is
over for us anyway. We can't detect attacks or defend our-
selves against them. All we can do is make steam and get
underway — otherwise we're simply a hazard to navigation."
At the other extreme are those who have not quite accepted
the computer, who insist that some manual backup will always
be necessary — to check the computer, if for no other reason.
As the saying goes, "the dipstick is never wrong." A further
sample of their logic is found in the Watch Officer's Guide
(18:178-179)
:
"There is a deplorable tendency among many offi-
cers to spend their watch with their noses glued
to the radar scope. While this invaluable de-
vice must often be used, it must not be to the
exclusion of visual observation and the intelli-
gent use of well-trained lookouts.... An im-
portant, and sometimes much neglected aid to
safe ship operation is the lookout. The train-
ed human eye is still superior in many respects
to the most elaborate machine."
In addition to custom and utility, law requires the use
of these manual backups, as pointed out in the following




"Around the clock on the nuclear-powered aircraft
carrier USS NIMITZ (CVN 68), lookouts scan the
sky and ocean for anything that could pose a
danger to the ship. Everything from driftwood
to aircraft, from ships to oil slicks, is
reported.
Lookouts are not just an archaic convenience —
they are required by Rule 5 of the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea.
The rule states: "Every vessel shall at all
times maintain a proper lookout by sight and
hearing, so as to make a full appraisal of the
risk of collision.
"
Advocates of manual backups point out that the mighty grease
pencil and plotting board are invaluable when, for some reason,
NTDS is lost. They also point out that even the awesome
NIMITZ Class carriers maintain paper message files because the
computerized Message Processing and Distribution System (MTDS)
has experienced an "unacceptable" amount of downtime. In 197 2,
the carrier FORRESTAL suffered a major fire which included
destruction of her NTDS. A Captain who was aboard her at that
time told this author that with all her CIC automated systems
inoperable, she was a beautiful and operational ship — without
a brain. Such catastrophic failures are probable in war, and
if the loss of one or two systems renders a ship totally help-
less, then there IS too much reliance on machines, too much
dependence on technology.
How much manual backup is enough? Of prime importance is
the absolute necessity to employ systems which "fail soft" —
the system MUST degrade gracefully; that is, it must not be so
fragile that small problems could render the entire system
inoperable. Even if the system is not working perfectly, criti-
cal information should still be available. It is therefore
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necessary to differentiate between "nice to know" information
and that information vital for continued military action in a
crisis. This latter information must still be available when
the system is in a fallback mode, when it is saturated, and
even in the event of system collapse. There is also a place
for some manual status boards on even the most modern ships:
boards for auxiliary information that is referred to frequently
by several people and which changes infrequently. The daily
call signs of ships, for example, would be much more convenient
on a group status board than on an individual ASTAB, especially
if an existing display must be replaced in order to recall such
static information. When written in phosphorescent chalk, this
information is available even if lighting is not available.




IV. PLANS AND POSSIBILITIES
Thus far this thesis has discussed current afloat command
control systems and some of the issues surrounding them. This
chapter will discuss a major new system currently in the plan-
ning stage and will close with some final comments regarding
the computer-Commander interface.
A. AEGIS
The Aegis Combat System is a computer controlled weapon
system. It will be placed on board the planned but as yet un-
named guided missile destroyer DDG-47. For the purpose of this
thesis, "Aegis" will refer to the combat system and "AEGIS" will
refer to the ship. The multi-mission AEGIS will utilize the
SPRUANCE hull and propulsion system and will have most of the
same weapons, including two 5-in./54 cal. guns with the MK-86
Gun Fire Control System, Tomahawk, ASROCS, Harpoon, Phalanx, and
LAMPS. It is the Aegis Weapon System itself which will make
the DDG-47 the first of a powerful new class of ships.
1. The Aegis Combat System
The heart of Aegis is the computer controlled AN/SPY-1A
phased array radar. This powerful radar sends out energy beams
in all directions and from ocean surface to stratosphere almost
instantaneously, and provides extensive search and track capa-
bility for hundreds of short and long range targets simultan-
eously. Accurate enough for fire control all the way to mis-
sile impact, this radar system has midcourse command guidance
communication with the Standard Missile 2 (SM-2). (2,16)
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Aegis uses three computers, one for radar control, one
for weapons control, and a third for command and decision.
Other major elements of Aegis are the Standard Missile 2, the
Guided Missile Launching System, the Fire Control System, the
Operational Readiness Test System, the Weapons Control System,
and the Command and Decision System (CDS) . It is this latter
system, of course, which is of most concern to this thesis.
The CDS provides tactical decision support, operator/system
interfaces, interfaces with other sources of tactical and intel-
ligence data, a data link with other units, and coordination
for functions such as air, surface, and submarine targeting.
To clarify terminology, it is emphasized that the Aegis
WEAPON System consists of the elements listed above. This sys-
tem could be put on any ship large enough to carry it, but the
SPRUANCE hull has been selected for this task. Eventually it
may be placed aboard some cruisers also. In contrast, the
Aegis COMBAT system consists of ALL weapons and sensors on an
Aegis equipped ship. Aegis is so powerful that it can coor-
dinate the weapons of an entire task force.
2 . History of Aegis Acquisition
As mentioned in Chapter II, it is not feasible to build
a current "state of the art" Naval ship. The following chron-
ology shows the long acquisition history of Aegis (2,14):
19 63 — Advanced Surface Missile System (ASMS) inaugurated.
Formal expression of requirement made by the Chief of Naval
Operations (CNO) . Beginnings of concept formulation.
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1964-5 — Program Definition Phase. Seven leading industrial
teams develop candidate systems.
1965 — Naval Officers and engineers and personnel from mili-
tary and industrial laboratories synthesize a basic system from
the contractor suggested techniques and concepts.
1965-7 — Secretary of Defense holds up development of system
in order to increase its commonality with Patriot, the Army's
air defense system.
1967 — Complete commonality with Army found to be unacceptable;
ASMS given go ahead
.
1968 — Three industrial teams selected for contract definition.
1969 — Source selection process continues. Key measurable
parameters developed. In December, ASMS becomes AEGIS and RCA
is selected as prime contractor.
1970 — Preliminary Design Review Completed. Naval training
units established in four plants to work with the development
engineering teams.
1971 — Congress reduces number of AEGIS nuclear destroyers
from 23 to five. Shipboard technical liaison program instituted
to increase Aegis industrial personnel's awareness of at-sea
equipment and user problems. Aegis moving from planning and
study phase to design and fabrication stage.
1972 — CNO authorizes new class of conventionally, vice nuclear,
powered destroyers to be designed expressly for Aegis Critical




1973 — The Secretary of the Navy directs that a gas turbine
- powered DDG and a nuclear class ship be considered for AEGIS.
System integration completed and determined to be ready for at
sea testing.
1974 — In May, Aegis is installed on the USS NORTON SOUND for
at sea testing. By July, both the DDG and the nuclear destroyer
are cancelled. In November, a Defense Systems Acquisition Re-
view Council convenes to consider Aegis for a new nuclear
cruiser.
197 5 — Navy and contractor testing and evaluation of Aegis
continues on the NORTON SOUND. Secretary of Defense directs
development of both gas turbine and nuclear powered AEGIS ships.
1976 — Aegis testing continues on the NORTON SOUND. Secretary
of Defense approves proceeding with adaptation of Aegis to the
basic SPRUANCE hull and power plant.
1977 — AEGIS Shipbuilding Project chartered, with one project
officer responsible for both the Aegis Combat System and the
AEGIS ship.
Present — at the time of this thesis (February 1979) , the fis-
cal year 1980 budaet includes one AEGIS class destroyer for
approximately 8 25 million dollars. The nuclear powered cruiser
is currently not being considered.
Future — AEGIS is scheduled to put to sea in another four
years — approximately twenty years after the original concept
formulation. Since Aegis will have an estimated thirty year
life span, the original planners were designing a system to be
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used fifty years in the future! Such a twenty year procure-
ment schedule is incongruous in a world with rapidly changing
technology. Those who set operational requirements, those
who design systems, and those who set fiscal policy MUST work
together to eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic delay.
3. Design of the AEGIS CIC
The arrangement of CIC equipment for the AEGIS Destroy-
er is currently under study. The AEGIS CIC has the same space
allocation as the SPRUANCE CIC, but with the addition of the
Aegis Weapons System equipment, weight and space considerations
become critical. The Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics
Laboratory (APL) has analyzed the command function (7) in order
to define the requirements for a Tactical Command Module (TCM)
.
a. The Tactical Command Module
The TCM is currently planned to have two large
screen displays, five small automated status boards, and three
operator positions. A large screen display (LSD) has a 3-1/2
foot square screen and is five feet in depth in order to use
rear projection techniques. The automated status boards
(ASTAB's) are seventeen inch diagonal cathode ray tube (CRT)
screens. The five ASTAB's are placed over the two LSD's, and
the viewing distance for the whole display is considered to be
optimal at about seven feet. The three operator positions are
expected to be filled by the Commanding Officer, a "facilitater
"
to help maintain the displays, and a Tactical Action Officer
(TAO) who will be in CIC full time and who will be in charge in
the Commander's absence. Each of these positions has its own
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console. Three consoles are envisioned to include CRT's with
alphanumeric and possibly graphic capabilities; a keyboard to
interface with the TCM computer; function keys, hook and ball
tab, and other LSD/ASTAB picture controls; and a communications
panel. Because of the AEGIS ' s task force weapons coordination
role, a Task Force Commander's staff will probably be aboard in
addition to the ship's own staff. Thus there will be two com-
plete TCM's in the AEGIS CIC, for a total of four LSD's, 10
ASTAB's, and six console positions (7,6).
The displays are to include (6):
Simultaneous displays of all warfare areas
Monitors of the tactical situation, equipment
readiness, and system status
Alerts of abnormal situations
Call-up of selected detailed data
Entry and Correlation of mission support information.
The detailed design for these TCM's is still under consideration,
Some of the issues currently under discussion include:
COLOR — Although some designers feel that color is necessary
for a good LSD, according to interviews given to this author,
the operational requirements part of the Navy does not consider
color to be worthy of inclusion in afloat displays at this
time. The AEGIS LSD equipment and software have limited, four
color capacity, and this capability may be added later.
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COMMANDER'S KEYBOARD — Some senior Naval Officers consider this
a total waste, as noted in the Commander-computer interface sec-
tion of the last chapter. However, one of the objectives of
the TCM is to improve the Commander's capability to understand
and control the combat system operations (6). As stated in the
APL Interim Report on Command Console Design (7:6) :
"In order to render a decision, an officer in
command must first assimilate information
pertinent to that decision. . . . The purpose
of the TCM is to support the process of com-
mand level decision making by providing the
requisite information and by providing paths
through which to initiate actions.... The
TCM will greatly enhance the ability of a
decision maker to monitor and direct . .
.
combat operations.... It is important to
understand that TCM is a tool at the dis-
posal of an officer in command and its level
of use will be established at his discretion."
The report later states (7:11) : "If he (the com-
mander) should choose to exercise his prerogative to delegate,
then he has confidence that the console is capable of satisfy-
ing any vested subset of his decision making requirements that
might become vested in a subordinate."
DESK SPACE — Although not all designers agree, it would appear
that even in the computer age some space should be dedicated to
a flat surface for hand written messages, printed material, and
other assorted support material.
DETERMINATION OF PROXIMITY OF OTHER PERSONNEL — Which other
personnel need to be near the TCM? Should the others have
small monitors of the main screens? Should the bridge? A




FUNCTION KEYS — With variable function keys, a great many
different operations can be performed in different modes. The
optimum tradeoff between variety and simplicity should be
studied. In addition, "natural language" programs should be
studied to supplement function key usage by the Commander.
FACILITATOR'S ROLE — Does he act as a computer expert? A
super-yeoman? a "gopher?" His role is still ill-defined.
LARGE SCREEN DISPLAYS — How will LSD's be used? A series of
display formats appropriate for LSD's is now being developed
(7). For years afloat personnel have asked for a clear, flexi-
ble, and reliable large screen display. Would it be better,
for example, to have the Operations Summary Console (OSC) on
an LSD, instead of having several people standing around it,
which renders the Captain's chair practically useless owing to
poor visibility? One suggestion is for large and small scale
displays of the air situation and other displays for the more
static surface and subsurface situations and for weather con-
ditions and forecasts. Now that the technology is available,
what IS the rationale for putting LSD's on ships? Because
the Commander is more likely to use them than small screens
where he feels like a mere operator? Because they enhance
"group feeling?" The cost benefit value of LSD's has not been
defined.
LOCATION OF THE TCM ' s — As noted above, two TCM's are scheduled
to be placed aboard the AEGIS, one for the ship's staff and
one for the embarked Task Force Command staff. The layout
relationship of the two TCM's becomes a driving factor in the
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CIC equipment arrangement. If the embarked command staff were
isolated in their own compartment, more sensitive information
could be displayed there. However, if the two TCM's were
located near or next to each other, the two staffs could more
readily confer and they could share some supporting staff
resources. Other considerations include area display visibility
and shipboard space limitations. Regardless of design fore-
thought, stanchions present positioning problems for final in-
stallation of equipment.
WHERE SHOULD THE TASK FORCE COMMANDER BE? — The Navy is spend-
ing hundreds of millions of dollars to obtain Aegis, and the
AEGIS ship is designed to coordinate the entire task force's
weapons. The Task Force Commander will probably have a staff
aboard AEGIS, but where will the Commander himself be? Since
it is unlikely that a Task Force Commander will give up the
prestige and habitability of a carrier for that of a mere des-
troyer, and since carriers will not have Aegis aboard, it is
unlikely that the Commander will ever see the TCM. If LSD's
are in fact being purchased for the Commander and not just
his staff, then the TCM and the Task Force Commander should
be on the same ship. Tactical Command should be where the
best available personnel, equipment and communications are.
b. Analysis to Determine the Characteristics of the
TCM
As mentioned above, Johns Hopkins APL is defining
the requirements for the TCM. Reference 7 documents the de-
sign investigation that defined a "suitable" console for the
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Commander. The report explains the functional analysis pro-
cess as related to TCM related personnel and equipment and the
resultant design analysis of the TCM staff. Phase I surveyed
and recorded the specific tactical responsibilities applicable
to the Commander and the TAO of an AEGIS ship. Through review
of Naval literature, command responsibilities were enumerated
and categorized in order to identify the functions pertinent
to afloat tactical command. Phase II was a detailed function
description of the command activity to be supported by a TCM.
This functional description was then used to derive the in-
formation, display, and action requirements to be provided by
TCM design. Phase III defined the displays and console com-
ponents necessary to satisfy the requirements, which led to
the definition of the TCM itself.
The report concludes with a few paragraphs on the
continuing console investigation.
B. CLOSING COMMENTS
Much research is needed in the area of afloat command
control. Among suggested research topics are:
1. What information is critical in various situations?
2. Commander's location in a crisis - what laws and traditions
must be altered, and how can these changes be implemented,
to enable the afloat Commander to be wherever he can best
deal with a crisis?
3. Large Screen Displays - how can they best be utilized?
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4. How does one justify the cost of enhanced command control
systems? This question is applicable to all elements of
afloat command control, of course. Two such areas men-
tioned in this thesis were color and LSD's.
5. How can senior naval personnel best be made familiar and
comfortable with the role of computer user? More junior
personnel should take the time now to become familiar with
today's technology and hopefully to become more receptive
to tomorrow ' s
.
After examination of this topic, the author has concluded
that the main problem in afloat command control is not finan-
cial or technological but the interface between financial
planners, technical experts, and operational users. The sys-
tems acquisition process is far too unwieldy for the dynamics
of technology. "Landlubber" designers tend to place too much
emphasis on technique and not give enough consideration to
operational conditions. Design teams must include experienced
afloat commanders. It is, of course, difficult to obtain the
services of such senior experienced personnel. It is also
difficult to detail such personnel for necessary testing and
training. Most important, afloat command control systems must
be adaptable to various users and situations. As stated in
an earlier quote from the Watch Officer's Guide (18:81-32),
"The capabilities of CIC (or afloat command control in general!)
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